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Abstract 
This paper addresses the issues that arise when corporations are required to make strategic choices regarding operation in foreign 
countries with diverse socio-political systems and culture, while taking into consideration all the relevant stakeholders, which 
ultimately affects the corporations’ current and future payoffs. Using the game theory principles we focus on Google’s internet 
search operations in China, particularly information dissemination decisions, and we examine how Google’s decisions affect the 
corporation’s success on the Chinese market, which is additionally determined by the information regulation policy of the 
Chinese authorities. In view of the fact that goals of Google and Chinese authorities are partially overlapping and partially 
conflicting this perfect information game contains both competitive and cooperative elements. In this paper we will argue that for 
Google or any other company in the equal situation the best strategic choice would be to respect and follow the laws and 
restrictions set by the authorities of the country in which the company chooses to operate. Finally, an analysis is completed 
through determining the optimal strategy for Google and Chinese authorities and finding the equilibrium point. This work 
provides a new perspective for knowledge engineering. 
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1. Introduction 
According to Milton Friedman primary goal of any profit organization is to maximize its profits [1], accordingly 
improving their market performance which will ultimately result in the growth of the corporation. This concept is 
primarily beneficial for the corporation’s shareholders. Conversely shareholders are not the only party affected by 
the decisions a corporation makes. While conducting business operations the modern enterprise considers the entire 
spectrum of its stakeholders, applying a strategy that will create value for the customer, the investor and satisfy any 
person or organization that has a vested interest in the corporation and the way the enterprise conducts its business. 
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Claus Ott identifies stakeholders as “the employees of the firm and all types of external participants including 
suppliers, consumers, and other clients as well as creditors and eventually society at large and the state” and points 
out that “corporations, from the point of view of Corporate Social Responsibility are no longer merely profit 
maximizing institutions, but rather they are institutions to coordinate and balance interests of share-holders and of 
stakeholders [2].” In many cases CSR is viewed as an “instrument to increase profitability rather than a fundamental 
goal in itself [3].” We can infer that corporations’ goal of maximizing profits will depend on the ability to establish 
good relationships with the most relevant stakeholders while following the principles of CSR.  However, not all 
stakeholders share the equal goals and have matching interests. Additionally, in situations of conflicted interests of 
stakeholders and the differing perception on what might be corporate socially responsible behavior that balance is 
difficult to find.  Choosing a particular set of actions the top management of the corporation considers being the 
supreme option should enable the enterprise to attain the competitive advantage considered necessary in today’s 
global market competition. The chosen strategy should correspond with the interests of the most relevant 
stakeholder, given that corporation’s market performance decidedly depends on the nature of that relationship.  
Choosing the wrong strategy can result in corporations passing up an opportunity of attaining competitive advantage 
that is absolutely essential to compete successfully on the global market.  
With the emergence of corporations operating in relatively new globally accessible industries such as internet, in 
countries with culturally, legally, politically, socially and economically differing characteristics they are bound to 
come across various obstacles on their path to the profits. Yang acknowledges the distinctiveness of the Chinese 
Internet culture which “consists of new cultural forms that emerge out of the interaction between Internet and 
society and that are the products of both cultural tradition and innovation [4].” Taking into consideration that China 
is a developing country and the scale of social and economic changes its nation is experiencing it is imperative for 
those changes to be managed effectively, especially when dealing with a relatively new and unregulated media, such 
as Internet, primarily the search engines which present an enormous hubs of information, hence being a threat to the 
health of a developing nation if not managed properly. In addition, it is essential for any corporation to be aware of 
all differences, respect and abide by them in order to operate without restraint on the foreign markets. The efforts of 
Google and China to co-operate have failed essentially as the result of Google’s reluctance on following through 
with the commitment of respecting local differences, in consequence abandoning the policy of self-censorship, 
which ultimately led to the Google’s pull out from the Chinese market.  
The ‘‘Google’s situation in China’’ section provides an abstract of the central events which led to Google’s 
current condition in China. Succeeding sections exhibit the application of the Game Theory principles and discuss 
their limitations and implications for Google’s operations on the Chinese market and relationship with the Chinese 
authorities.  
2. Google’s Situation in China 
Before establishing operations in China Google.com was accessible around 90 % of the time, all due to the 
content and the service not being in compliance with the laws and regulations of People’s Republic of China [5].  
Google had an imperative decision to make. The corporation had a choice between continuing the operation of its 
website from the United States of America, thus providing Chinese internet users a poor quality and slow service 
regulated by the Chinese authorities, and entering the Chinese market where the company would have more control 
over the way it manages its business. Eventually, in 2006 Google signed the “Public Pledge on the Self discipline 
for the Chinese Internet industry”, an agreement which is required to be signed by the all internet companies who 
are about to do business in China [6].Google established their presence on the Chinese mainland by opening their 
R&D center, announcing its intent to comply with Internet information dissemination laws and introducing China 
based Google.cn. These actions undertaken were divergent to the Google’s core principle.  According to Google’s 
mission there are two fundamental commitments: firstly, to please the interests of users and by doing so build a 
leading company in their industry; secondly, to make world a more informed and liberal place by expanding access 
to the information [7]. However, a secure Chinese government is trying to guarantee stability and sustainable growth 
by managing the flow of information. As a relatively new and still inadequately regulated media, Internet hasn’t 
been subjected globally to the same information dissemination laws and regulations as TV, radio, newspapers and 
books. Taking into consideration that Internet has a more powerful political impact in China than in other countries 
[8] spreading harmful information can cause riots and jeopardize the overall safety of the nation which makes 
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Internet regulation justifiable [9]. It might also be argued that this represents the rationale of any Internet company 
aspiring to operate in China consequently leading to the acceptance of local laws of the country chosen to operate in. 
Following the same principle and in order to enter China Google has added a third commitment to its mission: “Be 
responsive to local conditions [7].”Consequentially to the self censorship policy it was conducting Google was a 
subject of criticism from the USA Congressional Committee and world media.  Nevertheless, the company argued 
that it is contributing more to the increase of free flow of information by participating in China's Internet industry 
than by refusing to abide by the rules and regulations of the Chinese authorities and being denied entrance to the 
mainland Chinese market. "While removing search results is inconsistent with Google's mission, providing no 
information (or a heavily degraded user experience that amounts to no information) is more inconsistent with our 
mission," a statement said [10]. During a four year period Google worked together with the Chinese government to 
censor online information available to the Chinese public, as a consequence earning profits and strengthening its 
position in China.  In 2010, Chinese authorities enhanced their control of the Internet therefore further improving the 
network and information security conditions in the country. 2010. Statistical Report on Internet Development in 
China states that “Chinese government was actively involved in construction of laws and regulations, technical 
standards, infrastructure as well as network security system, etc; continuously enhanced the construction of network 
and information safety management platform; intensified control and monitoring on communication networks as 
well as prevention and checking on phishing sites, illegal websites and bad information, especially active control on 
mobile media and technical service websites; and perfected filing of domain name registration information[11].” 
Continuous enhancement of internet control was not perceived positively by Google and its leaders, and on January 
12, 2010 Google declared that it is no longer willing to comply with the Internet information dissemination laws and 
regulations in mainland China. The company made a resolution not to censor their search results on Google.cn and 
decided it will look into “the basis on which Google could run an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. 
We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China [12].” 
After the resolution Google temporarily discontinued its result filtering, only to restore it later without any 
explanation. On the 23rd of March 2010 Google started redirecting its Google.cn internet users to Google.com.hk. In 
this way Google provided an uncensored service by evading the Chinese control [13]. This decision by Google 
caused the Chinese authorities to block the access to all Google search sites. Some other Google services remained 
unaffected. This ban was lifted one day later. On June 30, 2010, in order not to get their Internet Content Provider 
license revoked, Google stopped redirecting the Google China internet users to the Hong Kong domain and 
positioned a link to Google Hong Kong. Google’s decision caused Chinese mobile operators; China Unicom and 
China Mobile to terminate their contract with Google consequently costing Google an opportunity to serve a huge 
mobile phone market. Google’s future regarding China remains uncertain. According to the figures from CNNIC, by 
December 2010, there were 457 million Chinese internet users, out of which the number of users for search engine 
amounts to 375 million which represents an increase of 93.19 million compared with the end of 2009. According to 
the projections the number should increase to 900 million by the year 2013 [11].  It can be derived that the overall 
growth in the number of internet users and the increased popularity of internet, particularly the search engine which 
has became the application with the largest internet users [11] make China a market of strategic opportunity, both in 
the medium and long run.  
3. Constructing a Game model 
We can define this game as a two player game, with Google and Chinese authorities as players. Chinese Internet 
users, who react predictably to the changes in the flow of the information without trying to affect the actions of 
Google or Chinese authorities, are not considered to be players, just an environmental parameter that affects weights 
and coefficients of payoff matrix.  Google’s current and potential competitors on the Chinese search engine market 
aren’t included in the game in order not to overly complicate the model, but their effect on payoff matrices of 
Google and Chinese authorities respectively is considered and accounted for.        
Each of the players has a goal to maximize his payoff by choosing an optimal action from the set of available 
actions. Google’s payoff is influenced by the factors laid out in its mission statement: providing the service in China 
in accordance to its global commitment on one hand and completeness of the service provided (i.e. freedom of 
information) on another. Chinese authorities’ goals are national stability and control of information as its 
prerequisite on one side and resource exchange with Google with Google’s participation on Chinese market as a 
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prerequisite on another. For the purpose of this game, we make the assumption that each player is rational and that 
each player is aware about the rationality of the opponent. The game in question is a game with perfect information 
– consequences of the choices for each player are known in advance.  
The game contains both competitive and cooperative elements, since goals of Google and Chinese authorities are 
partially overlapping and partially conflicting.  
3.1. Possible actions 
Google has a choice whether to filter its search results in compliance with Chinese laws or not, thus in the short 
term following its mission statement to the letter, but with different long term consequences. 
Gm = {filter search results, don’t filter search results} 
Chinese authorities can allow or block access to Google’s services, in order to maintain its interests of 
information control and political stability. 
Cm = {allow access to Google, block access to Google} 
 
3.2. Order of movement 
We will assume that this is a strategic game, i.e. that each player has no more than a single move available, 
reflecting the fact that strategic changes by one player would negatively affect the political will of another player to 
cooperate with the first player.  Google moves first, making a strategic decision whether restrict its search results or 
not. Chinese authorities, being in the position of power, respond to the move made by Google.  
 
3.3. Payoff matrix construction  
3.3.1. Payoff matrix for Google 
 
Primary goal of Google’s operation in China is providing a quality service in mainland China. Secondary goal of 
Google is promoting the freedom of information.  The first goal is by its nature directly related to profit and also 
represents a necessary prerequisite for the fulfillment of the second goal. Hence the importance of the first goal is 
necessarily higher than the importance of the second goal, with the difference in importance expressed by the 
positive constant α. Constant α can vary to reflect the presence of Google’s competitors on Chinese market.  
 
wg1 = α + wg2 - the importance of providing service in China                                             (1) 
wg2 - the importance of enabling the free flow of information 
 
All weights and coefficients are positive. 
Payoff matrix for Google has the following elements: 
 
a11: payoff in case Google doesn’t filter its pages and Chinese authorities allow access to Google 
a12: payoff in case Google doesn’t filter its pages and Chinese authorities block access to Google 
a21: payoff in case Google filters its pages and Chinese authorities allow access to Google 
a22: payoff in case Google filters its pages and Chinese authorities block access to Google anyway  
Using the weights wg1 and wg2, we calculate: 
The resulting payoff matrix for Google is:  
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⎥⎦
⎤
)
)
3.3.2. Payoff matrix for the Chinese authorities 
 
In its dealings with Google, Chinese authorities have two goals. The first goal is controlling the flow of 
information provided by Google’s services, in order to maintain political stability. Another is a mutually beneficial 
business relationship with Google, with additional positive effect on public opinion in foreign countries. Currently, 
Chinese authorities prioritize the information flow control, reflected in the value of a positive constant β.  
The weights are: 
 
wch1 = β + wch2  - importance of controlling the information flow                          (3) 
wch2 - importance of maintaining a business relationship with Google 
 
All weights and coefficients are positive. Payoff matrix for the Chinese authorities has the same layout as the one 
for Google, but different coefficient values. 
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3.3.3. Final payoff bimatrix for the game 
 
Seeing as goals of Google and Chinese authorities in this game are partially conflicting and partially 
overlapping, the game has elements of cooperation. It is described by a payoff bimatrix, which consists of ordered 
pairs formed from respective payoff matrices for Google and Chinese authorities. 
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Google moves by choosing a row, first row corresponding to filtering its pages, second row corresponding to 
ceasing to filter its pages. Chinese authorities moves by choosing a column, first column corresponding to allowing 
the access to Google’s pages, second column corresponding to blocking the access to Google’s services. 
Google, since it moves first, has only two strategies available: to filter its pages or not to filter its pages. 
SG = {Filtering, no filtering} 
Chinese authorities, since they move second, have a number of strategies available:  
 
⎪
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⎩
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⎧
=
otherwiseallowpagesitsfiltersitifGoogletoaccessBlock
otherwiseblockpagesitsfiltersitifGoogletoaccessAllow
GoogletoaccessblockAlways
GoogletoaccessallowAlways
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,
,
 
 
The last strategy is strongly dominated by other strategies, so we can discount it at the beginning. 
4. Determining the Optimal Strategy and Equilibrium Point
Our goal is to determine the optimal strategy for Google (if one exists), i.e. whether Google should filter its pages 
or not. In order to determine the optimal strategy, we construct the minimax tree representing the possible choices 
for both players, and analyze the consequences of players’ choices, starting from the bottom up. Google moves first. 
Therefore its choice is placed at the root of the tree, with left branch representing the choices not to filter its pages 
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and the right branches representing the choice to filter its branches. Nodes at the second, final level (Chinese 
authorities, in the position of authority, has the final word) represent subsequent decision by Chinese authorities, 
whether to allow access to Google’s pages (left branch) or block access to Google’s pages (right branch).At each 
stage, a player will make a decision that will maximize its utility, given that the opponent will follow-up with a 
rational decision that will maximize its own utility.  If Google chooses not to filter its pages (taking the left branch 
from the node), Chinese authorities decide between allowing the access to Google, resulting in the utility of -β for 
Chinese authorities, and blocking the access to Google, resulting in the utility of β for Chinese authorities. 
Therefore, in case Google chooses not to filter its pages, Chinese authorities will choose to block Google, resulting 
in a negative payoff  for Google and positive payoff β for Chinese authorities. If Google chooses to 
filter its pages, Chinese authorities have a choice between allowing access to Google, resulting in maximum payoff 
 for Chinese authorities, or blocking it, resulting in payoff β for Chinese authorities. Therefore, 
Chinese authorities will choose to allow access to Google, and the final payoff of this sequence of moves for Google 
would be α. Consequently, at the beginning of the game Google chooses between no filtering, with the payoff of 
 for Google and filtering, with the final payoff of  for Google. Therefore, Google will choose 
filtering. Hence, at the present the optimal strategy for Google is to filter its pages. Optimal strategy for Chinese 
authorities is to allow access to Google if Google filters its pages and block access to Google otherwise. No player 
has incentive to deviate from this strategy, given that no other players deviate, as deviation would result in a 
decrease of payoff. The expected payoff of the game is ( ) representing the fact that Google 
operates in China, providing services, but doesn’t provide unrestricted information to users and the fact that Chinese 
authorities maintain both control of information and a sound business relationship with Google. It is a hope of 
Google in choosing the current best move that through the passage of time and its cooperation with China it will be 
able to reduce the factor β to a smaller and eventually negative value, so that in the future requests for filtering will 
diminish and eventually free flow of information would be achieved. 
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Fig. 1. (a) Google and Chinese Authorities’ Decision Tree                                                         
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5. Conclusion  
       According to the analysis of Google’s information dissemination strategy in China, which was conducted by 
applying the principles of game theory, we can conclude that given the current circumstances Google’s optimal 
strategy is to filter its pages, therefore being in compliance with the rules and regulations of People’s Republic of 
China. The Chinese authorities’ optimal strategy is to allow access to Google if Google filters its pages and block 
access to Google otherwise. In the situation where Chinese authorities, or any country’s authorities for that matter, 
are the principal stakeholder alternative strategy would result in a decrease of payoffs. However, the situation might 
be changed if staying in China wouldn’t correspond with Google’s higher profit or if decision to move its servers 
from mainland China will affect the willingness of China’s authorities to conduct business with Google, forming 
partnerships with Google’s competition which may affect weights and the optimal strategy of both parties. This 
game theory analyses presents an innovative approach in determining an adequate strategy in a cross-cultural 
environment in which local authorities and different international corporations are the key participants. Given the 
increase in the international business activity and the conflicts that arise in between the participants there are 
different models introduced in order to ensure that the right business strategy is chosen by each party. With our 
model we attempt to provide an innovative way of selecting a strategy for a corporation when facing the laws 
specific to the country where it is doing business in and provide a basis for the further development of the new 
approaches. 
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